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Abstract
In this paper we estimate the demand for liquidity by US non ﬁnancial ﬁrms using data from
COMPUSTAT database. In contrast to the previous literature, we consider ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects,
suchascost-of-capitalandwages. Fromthebalancedandunbalancedpanelestimationsweinfer
that there are economies of scale in money demand by US business ﬁrms, because estimated
sales elasticities are smaller than unity. In particular, they are lower than in previous empirical
studies, suggesting that economies of scale in the demand for money are even bigger than
formerly thought. In addition, it emerges that labor is not a substitute for money.
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1
Since the seminal work by Keynes (1936) the focus of empirical investigations on the
properties of money demand has shifted from the aggregate to the individual level. The Keyne-
sian approach to the demand for money distinguishes three different motives: economic agents
hold cash either for transaction or for precautionary purposes on one side, while on the other
they can demand money for speculative reasons. The models used to explain the demand for
money and other liquid assets held by ﬁrms are based on transactions, wealth, and portfolio
balance. In the transaction approach one considers the interest rates paid on alternative liq-
uid assets and the transaction costs related to their management, concluding that cash balances
should increase less than proportionately with transactions. The wealth model, instead, relies
on the assumption that business ﬁrms will distribute their total assets among various categories
by equating their marginal rates of return. The portfolio balance view explicitly adds the risk
factor, as ﬁrms should balance risk and rate of return. In practice, the ﬁrm must compare the
interest rate earned on government securities with the risk of not holding money, that is the
possibility of forced liquidation of some assets with sure capital losses.
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the mechanisms that govern the demand
for money by business ﬁrms. This can be helpful in understanding and explaining the patterns
of money velocity or in predicting inﬂation and interest rates. Although recent macroeconomic
theories tend to de-emphasize the importance of monetary aggregates in the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism,
2 a quantitative determination of the demand for money by the agents in the
economy is crucial to assess the impact of monetary policies on the most relevant macroeco-
nomic variables. At a micro level, instead, a quantitative assessment of the demand for money
by ﬁrms can be important for ﬁnancial intermediaries and policy-makers to acquire more up-to-
date information about portfolio behavior and attitudes to risk.
The main contribution of the paper is twofold: from a theoretical point of view we or-
ganize the previous models of money demand by ﬁrms so as to incorporate the typical hetero-
geneity that characterizes ﬁrms. Actually, ﬁrms may exhibit different organizational structures
or industry-speciﬁc aspects that can affect cash holdings and therefore must be taken into ac-
count. On the empirical side, we analyze ﬁrms’ money demand using not only a balanced panel
with ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects, but also an unbalanced panel to obtain more precise estimates that
also consider its incompleteness.
In the previous literature many studies focus only on aggregate data rather than individual
data, and sometimes they do not distinguish among different sectors. Many other papers just
1 We would like to thank Badi Baltagi, John Duca, Kenneth Kopecky, Bruce Lehmann, Valerie Ramey, Alessan-
dro Secchi and David VanHoose for their useful comments. The views expressed are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reﬂect those of the Bank of Italy. Any remaining errors are our own.
2 See for example the review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the demand for money by Duca and
VanHoose (2004).8
concentrate on cross-sections and very few highlight the importance of the dynamics by using
panel data.
Another problem of most of the previous works is the usual assumption of constant cost-
of-capital across ﬁrms, which is highly inconsistent with the theory of ﬁnance, for which the
cost of borrowing crucially depends on ﬁrms’ characteristics.
Therefore, in sharp contrast with the previous literature, we use ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects for
all the variables that are assumed to affect cash holdings by non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Using the
COMPUSTAT database, we select data on ﬁrms in the manufacturing and in the wholesale
and retailing industries to estimate their demand for liquidity. Very few papers in the previous
literature consider different sectors, and many authors just analyze the whole sample of ﬁrms,
which can, however, give misleading results because ﬁrms in different industries are subject to
different rules and accounting procedures. To get more robust estimates, we compare different
panel data estimators, while, to our knowledge, so far only ﬁxed effects have been considered
in the literature. The results suggest that the economies of scale in the demand for money by
US non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms are even stronger than formerly thought. Indeed, the estimated sales
elasticities we ﬁnd (which are between 0.5 and 0.7) are much lower than those usually obtained
in the previous literature (between 0.8 and 0.9).
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2. some previous empirical studies on liq-
uidity demand are reviewed. In Section 3. our model speciﬁcation, in a Baumol-Tobin spirit,
is described, while in Section 4. the econometric speciﬁcation is discussed. In Section 5. a
description of the data is given, while in the subsequent Section 6. the empirical results are
presented and discussed. Then, in Section 7., some conclusions are drawn.
2. Previous Empirical Studies
Before introducing the theoretical model that will constitute the framework for our em-
pirical analysis, we present a brief review of the previous literature that has dealt with the
estimation of the demand for cash and other liquid assets by non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
One of the ﬁrst to analyze quantitatively the demand for money was Selden (1961), who
studied the postwar velocity of money by sectors. In his study, he uses cross-section data from
the IRS (Internal Revenue Service) and ﬁnds that velocity falls as ﬁrm size increases. This
result is due to the ratio of sales to total assets, which declines at a faster rate than the ratio of
a ﬁrm’s cash. Furthermore, he points to a consistent substitution effect between government
securities and cash and other liquid assets. This effect seems to increase directly with ﬁrm size.
In his argument, Selden emphasizes that the main reason for substituting cash and other assets
with government securities is the cost of holding money, which is deﬁnitely higher for smaller
ﬁrms because of the higher cost they face to raise money.9
Frazer (1964) explores the corporate demand for money by using cross-section regression
methods. He applies these techniques on quarterly cross-sections from the FTC-SEC Quar-
terly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations for the period 1956-1961. He ﬁnds that,
whereas cash falls relative to total assets, corporate liquidity - deﬁned as the ratio of cash and
government securities to current liabilities - rises with ﬁrm size. In this way he asserts the
importance of the precautionary motive for holding money and the possibility of economies
of scale. As highlighted by Vogel and Maddala (1967), Frazer’s ﬁndings are to be interpreted
with extreme care because he does not give other possible explanations for ﬁrms’ behavior and
completely ignores both the problems of estimating cross-sections in a dynamic context and the
bias introduced by using ratios.
Meltzer (1963) makes a great contribution to the cross-section analysis of business de-
mand for money, trying to reconcile Baumol-Tobin’s inventory model and Friedman’s (1959)
model. His evidence, based on data from 14 industries spanning 9 years taken from the IRS’s
Statistics of Income, shows that neither economies nor diseconomies of scale in holding money
predominate. Moreover, “...as a ﬁrst approximation, the data suggest that the cross-section
demand for money by ﬁrms is a function of sales and is linear in logarithms and unit-elastic.”
3
Whalen (1965) reformulates Meltzer’s approach by adding to the regressions the ratio of
total assets to sales, in order to allow for differences in ﬁrms’ size. He assumes that, within
each industry, at any given time, ﬁrms are identical in all respects but for the magnitude of
their business operation. The crucial assumption here is that the only factors that inﬂuence the
size of ﬁrms’ cash balances are the volume of their sales and the amount of their investment
portfolios. Using IRS data for the single year
4 1958-59 he tests a Baumol-Tobin-like model and
the reformulated Meltzer’s model to see if there are economies of scale for business transactions
and precautionary cash balances. The results are not conclusive in asserting the presence of
economies of scale because it is not possible to separate out the motivation for holding money
for every industry under examination.
Vogel and Maddala (1967) criticize previous studies because they do not take into account
the possibility of cross-section estimates in a dynamic context, as highlighted by Kuh (1959).
Kuh (1959) points out the difﬁculties of using cross-section regressions in a dynamic situation,
the variance of an array of data being attributable both to differences among individuals and
to variability over time. Therefore, from his point of view, it is necessary to employ what he
calls a ‘rectangular data array’ (that is a panel data) with observations on the same individuals
through time, so that the estimated coefﬁcients from the cross-section part and the time series
part can lead to a better interpretation of the phenomenon under study. Vogel and Maddala
3 As pointed out by Maddala and Vogel (1965), there is still an open question regarding the deﬁnition of money
as implied in the Baumol-Tobin model.
4 Whalen (1965) claims that in a cross-section approach, there is a better control over “extraneous” variables
affecting the demand for cash.10
(1967) verify the usefulness of all the preceding cross-section analyses in understanding and
analyzing the determinants of the demand for cash and liquid assets by manufacturing corpora-
tions. They try to test (i) whether a model of wealth or a model of transactions demand offers
the best explanation of the liquid asset holdings; (ii) whether there exist economies of scale
in the demand for cash by businesses; (iii) whether there are patterns of substitution between
cash and government security balances; and (iv) whether interest rates and other variables affect
ﬁrms’ portfolios. They highlight the important statistical issue that makes the previous cross-
section analysis a little controversial: in the context of liquidity demand there might be some
dynamic factors, such as expectations or lagged adjustments, that remain completely excluded
in a cross-section analysis. The real innovation in their analysis is their modern approach, for
which they study patterns of variation by industry, by year and by asset size class. Their results
conﬁrm Kuh’s warnings that cross-section estimates should be viewed with considerable cau-
tion in a dynamic context. Among the various conclusions, Vogel and Maddala (1967) ﬁnd that
it is extremely hard to distinguish between transactions and wealth models for money demand
by corporations. They ﬁnd substantial economies of scale in the demand for liquid assets by
ﬁrms and evidence that ﬁrms substitute government securities for cash at an increasing rate as
their size grows.
Ben-Zion (1974) argues that the cross-section estimates for ﬁrms’ demand for cash re-
ported in the literature have two main difﬁculties. First of all, the studies do not use a variable
cost-of-capital in their analysis, assuming implicitly that all ﬁrms in a given cross-section have
the same cost-of-capital. This assumption is inconsistent with the ﬁnance theory, according to
which this cost should depend on each ﬁrm’s appropriate risk class. Second, all the previous
studies use data of ﬁrms in different industries, rather than data on individual ﬁrms. Actually,
using data on individual ﬁrms makes it possible to obtain a much more coherent measure of
the cost-of-capital, as is typically assumed in the theory of ﬁrm valuation based on the ap-
proach of Modigliani and Miller (1958 and 1966) (1958 and 1966). Ben-Zion (1974) proposes
a simple extension of Baumol’s (1952) model, where money also enters into the ﬁrm’s produc-
tion function. From his model Ben-Zion is able to isolate two opposite situations: (i) a case
which resembles the classical Baumol solutions (demand elasticities for cash of 0.5) and (ii) a
case in which there are no transaction costs and the demand elasticity with respect to size is
unity. Clearly, the general solution falls between these extreme cases. The substantial contri-
bution by Ben-Zion is to consider as a proxy for ﬁrms’ cost-of-capital a function of the earning
per share, the price of the corporate share and the long-run growth of the earning per share.
With this speciﬁcation for the cost-of-capital, using the COMPUSTAT ﬁle for the years 1964
and 1965, Ben-Zion estimates money demand elasticities between 0.866 and 0.889, suggesting
some economies of scale in holding money. All his coefﬁcients have the predicted sign and
show the importance of the concept of cost-of-capital derived by Miller and Modigliani (1966).
Karathanassis and Tzoannos (1977) test the ability of two alternative monetary theories
such as the transactions model and the wealth adjustment model, to explain the demand for
money by business ﬁrms. They point out the relevance of using micro data instead of aggre-11
gate data because aggregation can lead to inaccurate results. In particular, they emphasize the
huge differences in the demand for money among the various industries by focusing on two
different sectors, such as the retailing and distribution industry and the electrical engineering
industry. They use data from the UK Board of Trade for the period 1965-72. Their estima-
tion procedure combines the cross-section analysis with the time series data available, in such a
way that “...the effects of transitory phenomena on the coefﬁcients will be removed and biases
avoided,” using an error component model. They ﬁnd economies of scale in cash holding in
the electrical engineering industry, but not in the retailing and distribution industry. Moreover,
they show how the choice of statistical methods and estimation procedures can be crucial for
discovering economies of scale, pointing out the necessity of conducing this kind of analysis on
a disaggregated basis.
Fujiki and Mulligan (1996) propose a model of demand for money by ﬁrms and house-
holds: their model is general enough to encompass the “money in production function” ap-
proach by Fisher (1974) and the “inventory-like” models proposed by Allais (1947), Baumol
(1952), Tobin (1956), and Miller and Orr (1966). This framework is very useful for interpreting
and comparing the various empirical speciﬁcations and estimates of individual money demand
that can be found in the literature; moreover, due to its peculiar speciﬁcation, multiple monetary
assets are admissible and the degree of ﬁnancial sophistication can be modeled both as endoge-
nous and exogenous. In particular, Fujiki and Mulligan (1996) deﬁne the demand for money in
three complementary ways: (i) as a Hicksian or derived demand in the case of ﬁrms, (ii) as a
Marshallian demand in which money is seen as a function of income and prices if we refer to
households, and (iii) as an expansion path that relates money balances to its opportunity cost
and the demand for another input to production. For our purposes we will restrict our attention
to the analysis of ﬁrms’ behavior.
Let us consider the production of ﬁrm i at date t, yit, as a function of a vector of inputs Xit





where lf is a parameter of the production function which is assumed to be constant over time
and across ﬁrms.
Without loss of generality, we can consider a simpliﬁed version of the model in which






Then, a production function for the transaction services Tit is needed. Fujiki and Mulligan
(1996) assume that such transaction services are produced with real money balances held by the
ﬁrm and, for simplicity, a certain type of labor (or generally another input different from xit)





where lf is a parameter of the production function assumed to be constant across ﬁrms and
mit is the stock of real money balances held by ﬁrm i at time t: The quantity lit represents the
units of labor used by the ﬁrm to produce transaction services, while Ait represents a sort of
productivity parameter that can be thought of as an indicator of the ﬁrm’s degree of ﬁnancial
sophistication. Moreover, it is assumed that ﬁrms rent inputs so as to minimize the following
cost function:
(1) cit = pitxit +witlit +Ritmit
which represents the total cost of the rental expenditures. The variable pit represents the price
of the composite input, while Rit is the nominal opportunity cost of money and wit is the wage
of the workers who are involved in the production of transaction services. In Mulligan (1997b)
and Fujiki and Mulligan (1996) it is assumed that the interest rate is the same across ﬁrms, Rt,
and this turns out to be a very strong assumption.
In order to get the optimal choice of inputs, as shown in Fujiki and Mulligan (1996)
and Mulligan (1997b), ﬁrms have to minimize the total rental expenditures, with respect to the
speciﬁc inputs, subject to the two production functions, that is:
G(yit;Rit;pit;wit;Ait) ´ min
xit;mit
(pitxit +witlit +Rtmit) (2)








wherewecan seethat theminimumcost achievedis afunctionof theproduction level yit andthe
rentalprices. Amongtheassumptionsthatarenecessaryinthepresentframework, werecallthat
the production function f is continuous, nondecreasing in all arguments and increasing in T and
that the production of transactions services T is continuous, nondecreasing in all arguments and
strictly increasing in A and m. Consequently, the cost function is homogeneous of degree one in
prices, increasing in yit and nondecreasing in the rental rates. G is also continuous and concave
in p, R, and w. In addition, other two assumptions are necessary to restrict the production
functions. First, for given rental rates, level of production, and level of ﬁnancial technology,
the elasticity of the production function with respect to transactions services approaches zero as
lf ! 0. Then, the returns to scale of the production function f are bounded from above for any
positive level of the two inputs.
In his empirical investigation of the determinants of money demand, using COMPUSTAT
data with a total of 102,088 ﬁrm-years for the period 1961-92, Mulligan (1997a and 1997b)
ﬁnds that large ﬁrms hold less cash, as a percentage of sales, than their smaller counterparts.
Moreover, he points out that his estimates are consistent with both scale economies in the hold-
ing of money and the observed decline in money velocity.13
With a demand model in the Baumol-Tobin tradition, Ad˜ ao and Mata (1999) ﬁnd sub-
stantial economies of scale in the use of money, and argue that the decline of money velocity
observed in many OECD countries is due to the increased presence of small ﬁrms. They use
data from a yearly survey conducted by the Bank of Portugal, for the period 1986-95, carrying
out an estimation with year and ﬁrm-speciﬁc dummies, which corresponds to a panel data anal-
ysis with ﬁxed effects. Their methodology differs signiﬁcatively from those of previous studies,
since they allow ﬁrms to differ in terms of risk and cost-of-capital, using a different interest rate
per ﬁrm. Their main result is that economies of scale are larger than what was found in the
previous empirical investigations, once ﬁxed effects are taken into account.
In the present paper, we follow the Baumol-Tobin tradition to derive the demand for
money, taking into account both industry-speciﬁc effects and ﬁrms’ heterogeneity.
3. The Model
As pointed out by Miller and Orr (1966), the so called inventory model proposed by Bau-
mol is less satisfactory if applied to business ﬁrms, because their pattern of cash management is
not “saw-tooth” - as it might be for households - but ﬂuctuates irregularly, and sometimes un-
predictably, over time. This suggests the presence of a certain degree of randomness in money
management. The weakness of their model lies in the set of underlying assumptions: some
of them are just technical simpliﬁcations, while others hardly affect the features of the model.
Miller and Orr classify their hypothesis in 4 groups. (i) The Baumol-like assumptions: namely,
the two-asset setting, the constant marginal cost per transfer and the absence of lead-time. (ii)
The minimum balance hypothesis: i.e. the presence of a deﬁnite threshold below which the
ﬁrms cash is not allowed to fall (this minimum level is set to be zero). (iii) The stochastic pro-
cess: here the nature of the stochastic process is deﬁned. They assume that the net cash ﬂows
are completely stochastic and are generated by a stationary random walk and this allows them
to assume that the random behavior of the cash ﬂow is characterized as a sequence of indepen-
dent, symmetric Bernoulli trials.
5 (iv) Firm’s objective function: here Miller and Orr assume
that the ﬁrm seeks to minimize the long-run average cost of managing the cash balance.
6 In their
framework, they derive a “transaction technology” T = Bml, where B is constant over time and
across ﬁrms and represents the time cost of cash management, and l is the cost of obtaining the
money, which is assumed to be independent from the amount of money demanded.
Even if this model represents an elegant analytical tool to describe the patterns of money
demand, what we observe in reality is fairly different. Firms are heterogeneous for several
5 This is not a very restrictive hypothesis, as Miller and Orr show: “... any of other familiar generating processes
with these features might equally well have been used, all leading to the same solution”.
6 The policy used in their paper is a two-parameter control-limit: cash is allowed to wander until it reaches either
the lower bound zero, or an upper bound at which the portfolio transfer takes place to restore the balance to a lower
level.14
reasons: different organizational structures, different objective functions, and industry-speciﬁc
aspects which can affect cash management. Following Ad˜ ao and Mata (1999), we try to in-
corporate this heterogeneity into the model of money demand. Let us assume a ﬁrm faces a
random ﬂow of transactions, with some distribution with mean ˆ c and variance s2
c < ¥. During
each period a ﬁrm’s employee obtains money at intervals of length t, bringing back from the
bank an amount of money equal to ˆ ct. The money reserves (MR) are deﬁned as a function:
7
(3) MR = f (ˆ ct;sc)
andweassumetheemployeegoestothebankwhentheamount(3)approacheszero.
8 Therefore,
we can think of wages as a proxy for a ﬁrm’s ‘shoe-leather costs’, i.e. the inﬂation-hedging
activities in which agents try to protect the value of their money balances in periods of high
inﬂation and that may also be at work for corporate money holdings.





The choice of the functional form in equation (3) turns out to be crucial as it will affect the
tractability of the aggregate money demand function. Ad˜ ao and Mata (1999) use a speciﬁcation
that allows the derivation of a Cobb-Douglas functional form for the transaction technology.
We set:




with the function g(¢) increasing
9 in sc and such that g(0) = 1 and g(¢) ¸ 1. We assume that
there might be some economies of scale in the demand for money: this speciﬁcation will allow
us to test it directly. Unlike in Tobin’s model, the cost of getting the cash l is not constant, but
proportional to the inverse of the intervals at which cash is demanded, i.e. l µ (1=t)
n, which





7 The function f should be increasing in both arguments.
8 As in Ad˜ ao and Mata, we assume this threshold is a positive number. Otherwise, if it were zero, the ﬁrm would
not be able to meet its ﬂow of transactions.
9 Of course, a higher volatility of the cash out-ﬂow implies a higher level of money reserves.15
We borrow the general framework from Miller and Orr (1966), with a transaction tech-
nology in the same spirit, but allowing the degree of ﬁnancial sophistication B to differ across
ﬁrms and over time. In particular, we let the transaction technology of ﬁrm i at time t be equal
to:
(6) Ti;t = Bi;tma
i;tlb
i;t
The spirit of the theoretical model from now on resembles the one by Fujiki and Mulligan
(1996): the ﬁrm solves the minimization problem as in equation (2), with the transaction tech-
nology speciﬁed in equation (6). Solving for mi;t the ﬁrst order condition of the problem deﬁned
in equation (2), we get the demand for money which can be linearized as:










where Fi;t is a function of B.
4. The Econometric Speciﬁcation
Once the money demand model has been speciﬁed, we have to choose the appropriate
panel data estimator to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters involved.
The presence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects may be due to technological and ﬁnancial hetero-
geneity or to non-random sampling. These effects might be correlated with the exogenous
variables as well, leading to consistency problems for the estimators. Thus, one of the main
econometric issues is the possible non-zero correlation between the exogenous variables and
the contemporaneous disturbances that would undermine the assumption of strict exogeneity.
A further important issue when one uses a panel of ﬁrms is that of non-random entry
and exit. However, we can say that this selection problem is not as relevant as when one tries to
model and estimate investments. Actually, a ﬁrm might be very unlikely to exit from the sample
only because it has liquidity problems. The reasons for a possible exit are deeper and involve
ﬁrms’ investment strategies, of which the demand for liquidity only represents a small part.
Another concern is possible measurement error. According to the theory, sales elastici-
ties should in fact be around unity, but in reality they are usually smaller (even much smaller).
This might be related to possible measurement errors in sales data and in the other variables
examined. With such a measurement error, the estimates would be downwardly biased, but as
highlighted by Mairesse (1990) these problems would be similar to the possible endogeneity16
problem with the within estimator. The between estimator is not affected so much by the en-
dogeneity problem because the ﬁxed effects are usually averaged and then wiped out for large
T. Instead, the within estimator would be inconsistent. Moreover, with measurement errors,
the between estimator tends to minimize their importance, while the within estimator tends to
magnify their effects, yielding greater bias.
In the empirical speciﬁcation we need to assume that all differences between companies
in the cash-ﬂow structure and in the degree of ﬁnancial sophistication are persistent over time,
so that they can be captured by the individual ﬁxed effects. Furthermore, we allow for possible
changes in the degree of ﬁnancial sophistication over time, imposing that such movements have
the same effects on all ﬁrms at each point in time. To control for such economy-wide changes
in ﬁnancial sophistication, we include time effects in the empirical speciﬁcation. However, we
leave all the ﬁrm-speciﬁc changes in the ﬁnancial technology as residuals.
In sum, we mainly model time and ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects as ﬁxed effects, and the empirical
speciﬁcation of equation (7) turns out to be:
(8) logmi;t = ai+bt +glogRi;t +dlogwi;t +qlogyi;t +ei;t
where ai are the ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects and bt are the time effects. In practice, we assume a
two-way error component regression model where the disturbances are composed by an unob-
servable individual effect, an unobservable time effect and a purely stochastic disturbance.
10
This particular speciﬁcation is very useful because it removes the effects of all the persis-
tent differences among ﬁrms from the estimates. In practice, the estimated demand elasticity
(q) will be immune from any difference in money holding between small and large ﬁrms. We
have to consider that normally, small and large ﬁrms differ not only in terms of size, but also in
many other aspects, for example cash-ﬂow structure and degree of ﬁnancial sophistication.
Introducing time effects in the empirical speciﬁcation, the variable Rit reﬂects the devia-
tions of each ﬁrm’s cost-of-capital from its average level over time, rather than the evolution of
the overall level of interest rates. The effects of the entire evolution of interest rates and changes
in ﬁnancial technology and wages are captured by the time effects.
We also consider the assumption that the ai’s , that is the ﬁrm heterogeneity, are i.i.d.
random variables. In this way, we can test any endogeneity by the Hausman test and see if the
ﬁxed effects estimator is also consistent. To our knowledge, so far in the literature only ﬁxed
effects have been considered. Therefore, it will be very informative to compare the results from
such different estimators.
10 See Baltagi (2001) for a comprehensive treatment.17
5. The Data
The data used in the present study are obtained from the COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual
Expanded ﬁles for the period 1982-2000. COMPUSTAT is a database of ﬁnancial, statistical
and market information which provides annual and quarterly Income Statement, Balance Sheet,
Statement of Cash Flows and supplemental data items on more than 15,000 publicly held com-
panies. The ﬁrms in this database are all companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange
and the American Stock Exchange. Moreover, US ﬁrms that ﬁle, or have ﬁled, either 10-K or
10-Q forms with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are also included.
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The variable that we use as our proxy for money holdings by business ﬁrms (mit) is given
by ‘cash’ (balances at the end of the year), which includes bank deposits and some kinds of
short-term investments.
12 Since January 1994, many commercial banks and other depository in-
stitutions have adopted sweep programs to avoid statutory requirements on transaction deposits.
These programs reduce the required reserves by sweeping demand deposits, ATS, NOW
and other checkable deposits into saving deposits, in particular money market deposit accounts
(MMDAs). Sweep accounts may distort ﬁrms’ holding of money, but Anderson and Rasche
(2001) and Anderson (2002, 2003) argue that deposit-sweeping programs create a shadow
MMDA deposit which is not visible to customers and, therefore, to them it appears as if their
transaction account deposits are unaltered. For this reason, although COMPUSTAT does not
collect information about MMDAs, any balances swept into MMDAs during business hours are
likely to be included in the item ‘cash’.
The other variables used in the empirical analysis are:
² yit - total ‘net sales’ for ﬁrm i during year t;
² wit - average wage for ﬁrm i, computed as the total payroll (given by ‘labor and related
expense’) divided by the number of employees at the end of the year t;
² Rit - cost-of-capital for ﬁrm i at yeart, computed as the total ﬁnancial expenditures during
the year (given by ‘interest expense’), divided by the total debt (given by ‘total liabilities’)
at the end of the year
13 as in Ad˜ ao and Mata (1999). Actually, this measure represents the
cost of credit and has the advantage of being ﬁrm-speciﬁc. In addition, it is a weighted
average of interest rates paid on short- and long-term loans.
11 Some Canadian companies are also reported in the COMPUSTAT database, but they are excluded from the
present work.
12 We have also used a broader deﬁnition of money holdings given by ‘cash and short-term investments’ in order
to accomplish a different deﬁnition of money. The results are quite consistent with the previous deﬁnition of
money with negligible differences and we have decided not to report them for the sake of brevity. However they
are available from the authors upon request.
13 We emphasize the possible problems that can arise when dealing with this kind of data. Because the ﬁrm’s18
All the variables are in million dollars and have been converted in 1996 dollars using the
GDP implicit price deﬂator.
We focus our analysis on ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector (SIC codes: 2000-3999) and
in the wholesale and retail sector (SIC codes: 5000-5999). This choice is based on the great
economic role of these two industries and their importance in the particular question we are try-
ing to answer, that is the determinants of the demand for money by corporations. Firm behavior
in other sectors may differ substantially, giving misleading results. For example, government
regulation inﬂuences the public utilities, transportation and farming industries, while the ﬁrms
in the Financial Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) industry often use different accounting pro-
cedures and have different constraints affecting their cash holdings.
We include a ﬁrm i in our data set for year t if the variables cash (m) and sales (y) are
both reported for that particular year and are greater than zero. In other studies, such as in
Mulligan (1997a and 1997b) another selection criterion is to pick the ﬁrms with sales of at
least $1 million. This choice is justiﬁed by the possible quantitative problems that might arise
because Standard & Poor COMPUSTAT rounds
14 cash to the nearest $1,000. We think that such
a criterion can induce a serious censoring problem and for this reason we consider all the sample
of ﬁrms.
15 Further, we can argue that usually smaller ﬁrms have more ﬁnancial constraints than
their bigger counterparts, and therefore their demand for liquidity is crucial to analyzing money
demand by ﬁrms.
In the sample (when we consider only ﬁrms’ net sales and cash) there are 59,951 ﬁrm-
years. Table 1 displays the summary statistics for each of the selected variables. We notice im-
mediately that the number of valid observations for all the selected industries is around 64,000
except for the variable w. In this case the problem is due to the huge number of ﬁrms in the
database that do not report the value for their labor expenses.
16 From Table 1 we see that both
the scale of operation and cash vary dramatically across ﬁrm-years. Furthermore, we notice a
Statement of Income usually contains ﬂow variables, that is variables relating to all the period of interest, whereas
in the ﬁrm’s Balance Sheet we ﬁnd stock variables, that is variables measured at a certain moment, a compatibility
problem may arise. For instance, we can think that the interest paid on loans during the year may not entirely
correspond to the real level of loans observed at the end of the year, the date at which the balance sheet is measured,
because some of those loans might have been liquidated during the year considered. Thus, typically, ﬂow variables
are much more reliable in measuring the true average value than the stock variables, but it is not possible to
overcome this problem.
14 Standard&Poor COMPUSTAT rounds all the data items (most of which are expressed in million of dollars) to
the nearest thousand dollars.
15 To make a useful comparison of our results with those by Mulligan’s (1997a), in a previous version of the
paper we have also considered all ﬁrms with sales greater than one million dollars. For both models estimated
in the empirical exercise, the estimated sales elasticities are much higher than those from the complete sample.
Therefore, we might argue that one of the possible reasons for introducing such a constraint by Mulligan (1997a)
might be due not really to the fact that COMPUSTAT rounds all the ﬁgures to the nearest $1,000, but rather to the
fact that he gets estimated sales elasticities closer to the numbers appearing in the literature.19
very pronounced variation in all variables except the wages for the manufacturing industry. The
variable w is the one displaying the greatest variation across ﬁrm-years for the retailing indus-
try. Probably, this reﬂects this industry’s extreme sensitivity to overall economic conditions and
consumers conﬁdence.
6. Empirical Evidence and Discussion
In this section we present various regression estimates and make some comments. The
empirical analysis focuses on two alternative derivations of the demand for money given in (8).
In the ﬁrst derivation we consider only sales as the explanatory variable. This is what we call
the ‘basic model’, that is the regression
(9) logmi;t = a+blogyi;t +ei;t:
In the second speciﬁcation we take into account other determinants of the demand for
liquidity by ﬁrms, such as cost-of-capital and wages. The estimated regression for the ‘large
model’ is:
(10) logmi;t = a+blogyi;t +glogRi;t +dlogwi;t +ei;t:
We analyze both models in a typical cross-section context by considering ﬁrst the OLS
regressions year by year and then pooled regressions. In this way, it is possible to highlight the
gains from the panel data analysis that follows.
6.1 Preliminary Estimates
We initially estimate a series of cross-section OLS regressions year by year, whose results
are shown in Figure 1. The upper-left panel of Figure 1 displays the sales elasticities when we
consider the basic model in (9). We can see the great differences between the estimated sales
elasticities when industries are considered altogether and when they are considered separately.
For all the ﬁrms selected (continuous line) the sales elasticities vary from 0.58 to 0.77, while
for the manufacturing ﬁrms (dashed line) they vary from 0.58 to 0.79 and for the retailing
businesses (line with circles) elasticities vary from 0.63 to 0.79. When we consider the ‘large
model’, from the upper-right panel of Figure 1 we can notice very similar patterns, but now the
16 In the two industries considered, only the 6% of the ﬁrms that report their number of employees by the end of
the year also report their labor expenses.20
variation across years is even higher. Looking at all ﬁrms (continuous line), the elasticities (b)
range from 0.64 to 0.87, while with the manufacturing corporations (dashed line) the parameters
b’s vary from 0.58 to 0.92 and for the retailing businesses (line with circles) the elasticities go
from 0.61 to 1.07. The upper panels show the inadequacy of cross-sections that cannot capture
the dynamics in the data and the usefulness of a panel data analysis, as highlighted by Vogel
and Maddala’s (1967) critique.
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The lower-left and the lower-right panels of Figure 1 depict the results from the cross-
section estimates for the cost-of-capital and wage elasticities, respectively. In these ﬁgures the
variation across years is stronger than in the previous pictures and particularly among different
sectors. Overall, the interest rate elasticities vary from -0.57 to 0.05, while in Manufacturing
they range from -0.74 to 0.10 and in Retailing they range between -1.15 and 0.24. Since the
interest rate represents the opportunity cost of holding cash balances, we should expect that a
higher cost-of-capital will lower the demand for money. From these cross section estimates we
can see that the estimated elasticities have a wide range and may inconsistently end up being
positive.
Considering wage elasticities, we notice that overall, their range is between -0.11 and
0.55, while for the manufacturing ﬁrms they vary from -0.35 to 1.34 and for the retailing busi-
nesses the estimates range from -0.25 to 0.40. If we think that labor is a substitute for money,
we should expect that wages increase the demand for money. Therefore, cross section estimates
may give elasticities with a counter-intuitive sign.
Table 2 presents the results from the pooled regressions when year effects are taken into
account. The table shows the estimated sales elasticities for the basic and the large model. For
the former, we have sales elasticities around 0.65, while for the latter we obtain slightly higher
estimates around 0.75. The estimated interest rate elasticities are all signiﬁcant and around
-0.20, consistent with the model predictions. The estimated wage elasticities present differ-
ent values: the estimates range from 0.22 to 0.33 and are consistently positive and signiﬁcant
for all the ﬁrms in the sample and for the manufacturing businesses, but not for the retailing
companies.
18
17 To check the robustness of our results, we have run some additional regressions by adding the logarithm of the
variationintotalinventoriestoallourmodels. Theresultingestimatedinventoryelasticitiesarealwaysinsigniﬁcant
and the other estimated elasticities do not change considerably. The same results hold when we add the log of the
inventories.
18 In these and in the following estimates the wage elasticities are almost always insigniﬁcant. Thus, we have also
estimated all the large models by dropping the wage variable. All the remaining estimated elasticities are slightly
lower than in the full model, whereas most retail regressions present the same estimates.21
6.2 Balanced Panel Data Analysis
Table 3 depicts the results from the panel data estimation of the basic model in (9). The
upper panel shows the estimates without year effects, while the lower panel depicts the same
estimates with year effects. The table displays the between, the ﬁxed effects (within) and the
random effects estimates for the sales elasticities, which indicate signiﬁcant values around 0.60
for both panels. As can be seen, the sales elasticities from the three estimators without year
effects do not differ substantially, meaning that the possible measurement error is less important
when we do not consider year effects.
From the Hausman test we can see that we reject the null hypothesis of absence of corre-
lation between the individual effects and the regressors for all the ﬁrms at the 5% level, while
for the retailing industry the rejection is at the 1% level. However, in the case of manufacturing
ﬁrms, we cannot reject the null of absence of correlation between the individual effects and the
regressor in (9).
Once we take into account year effects (lower panel of Table 3), the estimated sales elas-
ticities are also signiﬁcant and do not change considerably (they are around 0.57), except for
the within estimates which are around 0.51. Thus, in this case, it might be that the measurement
error plays a major role, biasing downward these estimates.
The Hausman test leads us to reject the null of no correlation between individual effects
and the explanatory variables at any conﬁdence level.
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the large model with and without year effects.
With no year effects the between estimated sales elasticities are around 0.67; the same estimates
are around 0.69 when we consider year effects. The ﬁxed effects estimated sales elasticities
range from 0.32 to 0.48 in the upper panel, while with year effects they vary from 0.23 to
0.49. The estimated sales elasticities from random effects are quite stable, being around 0.62
with no year effects and around 0.64 in the lower panel. As can be seen, the differences in
the estimated sales elasticities from the between and the ﬁxed effects estimators are remarkably
large, indicating that the latter ones are amplifying possible measurement errors.
19 In both
panels all the elasticities are signiﬁcant, except for some, such as those related to wages and
cost-of-capital. In particular, the sign of the signiﬁcant wage elasticities is positive as expected
from the theoretical model, and the sign for the interest rate elasticities is consistently negative.
The Hausman tests show the presence of endogeneity for all the cases at 1% signiﬁcance level,
except for the retailing ﬁrms when year effects are considered.
We have seen that according to the Hausman test, the null hypothesis of absence of cor-
relation between individual effects and the regressors is almost always rejected. Therefore, we
19 We think that the main source of measurement error is given by our proxy for wages. Actually, in our sample,
many ﬁrms do not report either ‘labor and related expense’ or ‘number of employees’ at the end of the year.22
have decided to apply a 2SLS method to estimate sales elasticities for the two different models
presented, as in Mulligan (1997a) and Ad˜ ao and Mata (1999). Actually, there might be errors
in the measurements of sales that determine downward biased elasticities. To control for such
bias, we assume that such errors are serially uncorrelated. Thus, it is possible to obtain consis-
tent estimates of the elasticities with instrumental variables (IV), using as instruments lagged
log values of net sales (log(yt¡1)), the cost-of-capital (log(Rt¡1)) and wages (log(wt¡1)).
Table 5 reports the between and the within estimated elasticities for the basic and the
large model with IV. As can be noticed, the between and within estimated sales elasticities
for the basic model present very small differences, ranging from 0.51 to 0.73, except for the
retailing ﬁrms. For the large model there is a slightly bigger difference among the between and
the ﬁxed effects estimates. Overall, we can see that there is no difference between considering
the year effects or not. The interest rate elasticities are almost all signiﬁcant and with the right
sign, except for the model with all ﬁrms without year effects. Very few wage elasticities are
signiﬁcant and with the right sign, but for the model with all ﬁrms in the sample without year
effects, where the sign is inconsistently negative.
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In sum, all the results so far have conﬁrmed that the estimated sales elasticities range
between 0.60 and 0.70 even after accounting for possible endogeneity problems.
6.3 Unbalanced Panel Data Analysis
In the data we have selected from COMPUSTAT, many ﬁrms are not observed over the
entire sample period: this leads to an unbalanced (or incomplete) panel. We adopt the approach
suggested by Baltagi (2001) and use weighted least squares (WLS) which correspond to gener-
alized least squares (GLS). The basic difference in the case of WLS for unbalanced panels is in
the crucial dependence of the weights on the lengths of the time series available for each ﬁrm.
Table 6 shows the estimated sales elasticities for the basic and the large model obtained
using the between estimator with WLS. We can see that the estimated sales elasticities for
both models (with and without year effects) are nearly identical and around 0.70. The interest
rate elasticities are almost always signiﬁcant and with the right sign, while only some wage
elasticities are signiﬁcant and with a sign consistent with the theory.
Thus, considering the unbalanced-ness can yield more precise estimates of the money
demand by COMPUSTAT ﬁrms.
21
20 We have performed the same analysis using only the lagged net sales as an instrument. The results for the
large model are quite similar, but the estimated elasticities are in general slightly lower than those obtained by
considering all the instruments.
21 In order to test the sensitivity of our data to the sweep account issue, we have split the sample into two subpe-
riods: from 1982 to 1993 and from 1994 to 2000, the sweep account era. Our estimated elasticities do not change
substantially over the two subperiods. Moreover, we have employed the Chow test for the null of hypothesis of23
Therefore, we can conclude that when we take into account ﬁxed effects, time effects and
above all ﬁrm-speciﬁc cost-of-capital and wages, we ﬁnd substantial economies of scale,
22 with
estimated sales elasticities around 0.5-0.7. A summary of the estimated sales elasticities of all
the models considered is depicted in Figure 2. These results are lower than the 0.8 value of
Mulligan (1997a) and the 0.9 value of Ben-Zion (1974) and in general all the other estimates in
the literature, except for Ad˜ ao and Mata (1999), who also ﬁnd values around 0.5 by taking into
account ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects for their panel of Portuguese ﬁrms. However, if we think that pos-
sible measurement errors might bias downward the ﬁxed effects estimates, we can conclude that
the estimated sales elasticities are around 0.60-0.70. Only by discarding the small companies,
as Mulligan (1997a) does, can we obtain estimates that are in line with the previous literature,
even though, doing so gives rise to a serious censoring problem.
7. Conclusions
Our paper ﬁrst organizes the previous theoretical models of money demand by ﬁrms tak-
ing into account ﬁrms’ heterogeneity and then we estimate the demand for money by US non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms using balanced and unbalanced panel data with ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects. We use the
COMPUSTAT database and select the item ‘cash’ to describe cash holdings by corporations.
Our focus is on two particular industries that best reﬂect the demand for money by ﬁrms: manu-
facturing, and wholesale and retailing. In addition, in sharp contrast with the previous literature,
we use ﬁrm-speciﬁc data for the variables that are assumed to affect ﬁrms’ money demand, such
as cost-of-capital and wages. We estimate the derived demand for money, both in the basic form
(where money balances are regressed only on net sales as a proxy for each ﬁrm’s size) and in
the large form (where the demand for money is not only a function of ﬁrm’s net sales, but also
of its cost of borrowing and wages). We ﬁrst estimate cross sections and ﬁnd that ignoring
the dynamics can be very misleading, as highlighted by Vogel and Maddala (1967), because
the estimated elasticities turn out to be very erratic and sometimes also inconsistent with the
theory. Afterwards, we estimate pooled regressions with year dummies ﬁnding quite similar
results. Finally, we analyze the whole panel of ﬁrms by calculating between, ﬁxed effects and
random effects estimates of the various elasticities. In this way we can check the robustness of
the estimates against possible measurement error problems.
We ﬁnd that there are substantial economies of scale in the use of money by US ﬁrms.
Our estimated sales elasticities are between 0.50 and 0.70, depending on the assumptions used.
These are much lower than the ones found in the literature (between 0.8 and 0.9) and lead us
to conclude that the economies of scale in cash holdings by ﬁrms are higher than previously
structural stability which is not rejected in most speciﬁcations.
22 The economies of scale are measured by the reciprocal of the parameter q in (8), because it represents a+b
in (7). Therefore, the lower the estimated sales elasticities, the greater the economies of scale in the demand for
money by COMPUSTAT ﬁrms.24
thought. This observation leads to the conclusion that small and large ﬁrms differ in terms of
their demand for money; this issue, although important, goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd negligible and statistically insigniﬁcant effects of labor in cash holdings
by ﬁrms, implying that labor is not a substitute for money as the theoretical model predicts.
Probably, this result is due to our proxy of wages, that is the ratio of labor and related expenses
to the number of employees at the end of each ﬁscal year. This measure is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, but
only very few ﬁrms report both items in the COMPUSTAT database, leading to conspicuous
measurement error problems when we use this variable. In contrast, the cost-of-capital elastici-
ties are all signiﬁcant and consistent with the fact that the interest rate represents the opportunity
cost of holding money.
Our results suggest further research is needed to understand the possible effects of sample
attrition and measurement errors in the determinants of demand for money by ﬁrms.References
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable N. of Valid Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All Industries
m 60226 37.736 254.537 0.00093 13320.0
y 67259 1179.162 6093.778 0.00096 192618.9
w 3612 43.978 513.726 0.03633 30880.5
R 64320 0.052 0.114 0.00002 12.7
Retailing
m 13505 22.214 106.809 0.00097 5186.0
y 14907 1277.159 4751.483 0.00231 178828.9
w 1139 45.708 914.626 0.48512 30880.5
R 14422 0.052 0.099 0.00003 9.0
Manufacturing
m 46721 42.222 283.072 0.00093 13320.0
y 52352 1151.258 6424.665 0.00096 192618.9
w 2473 43.181 20.183 0.03633 274.3
R 49898 0.052 0.118 0.00002 12.7
Note: m is our proxy for the cash holdings by business ﬁrms and represents ‘cash’. y
represents the ﬁrm’s ‘net sales’, w is our proxy for the wages and R is the ﬁrm’s cost-of-
capital. The GDP implicit price deﬂator is used to convert all current dollars in 1996 dollars.28
Table 2: Results from pooled regressions
Basic Model: Large Model:
logmi;t = a+bt +qlogyi;t +ei;t logmi;t = a+bt +glogRi;t
+dlogwi;t +qlogyi;t +ei;t
With Year Effects
Basic Model Large model
All Man Ret All Man Ret
log(y) 0.6691*** 0.6761*** 0.7086*** 0.7659*** 0.7561*** 0.7706***
(0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0061) (0.0092) (0.0110) (0.0181)
log(R) - - - -0.2054*** -0.2029*** -0.2053***
- - - (0.0319) (0.0408) (0.0507)
log(w) - - - 0.2240*** 0.3259*** -0.0037
- - - (0.0350) (0.0614) (0.0558)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.492 0.497 0.518 0.751 0.758 0.665
N 59953 46524 13429 2934 1937 997
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1%
respectively.29
Table 3: Results from panel data analysis: basic model
Basic Model: logmi;t = ai+bt +qlogyi;t +ei;t
Without Year Effects
Between Fixed Effects Random Effects
All Man Ret All Man Ret All Man Ret
log(y) 0.600*** 0.598*** 0.659*** 0.589*** 0.595*** 0.569*** 0.600*** 0.602*** 0.626***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
H.T. - - - - - - 4.16** 1.29 27.49***
R2 0.462 0.460 0.510 0.462 0.460 0.510 0.462 0.460 0.510
N 59951 46524 13427 59951 46524 13427 59951 46524 13427
With Year Effects
Between Fixed Effects Random Effects
All Man Ret All Man Ret All Man Ret
log(y) 0.597*** 0.601*** 0.652*** 0.507*** 0.507*** 0.516*** 0.556*** 0.557*** 0.599***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
H.T. - - - - - - 977.93*** 834.48*** 984.61***
R2 0.427 0.418 0.405 0.491 0.495 0.518 0.491 0.496 0.518
N 59951 46524 13427 59951 46524 13427 59951 46524 13427
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. H.T. is the Hausman test to test the null of absence of correlation
between the individual effects and the regressors. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.30
Table 4: Results from panel data analysis: large model
Large Model: logmi;t = ai+bt +glogRi;t +dlogwi;t +qlogyi;t +ei;t
Without Year Effects
Between Fixed Effects Random Effects
All Man Ret All Man Ret All Man Ret
log(y) 0.676*** 0.668*** 0.674*** 0.383*** 0.319*** 0.481*** 0.641*** 0.640*** 0.621***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.040) (0.040) (0.055) (0.057) (0.018) (0.021) (0.033)
log(R) -0.268*** -0.152 -0.412*** -0.144*** -0.123*** -0.168*** -0.163*** -0.130*** -0.194***
(0.079) (0.104) (0.120) (0.037) (0.047) (0.058) (0.033) (0.043) (0.052)
log(w) 0.223*** 0.428*** -0.113 1.4E-04 0.089 -0.118 0.087* 0.198*** -0.125*
(0.078) (0.130) (0.127) (0.059) (0.082) (0.082) (0.047) (0.070) (0.068)
H.T. - - - - - - 63.02*** 47.78*** 12.25***
R2 0.736 0.740 0.646 0.733 0.740 0.651 0.736 0.740 0.652
N 2934 1937 997 2934 1937 997 2934 1937 997
With Year Effects
Between Fixed Effects Random Effects
All Man Ret All Man Ret All Man Ret
log(y) 0.694*** 0.704*** 0.689*** 0.331*** 0.229*** 0.493*** 0.647*** 0.648*** 0.637***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.041) (0.041) (0.054) (0.061) (0.017) (0.020) (0.032)
log(R) -0.190** -0.093* -0.222 -0.108*** -0.092** -0.145** -0.135*** -0.105** -0.166***
(0.081) (0.103) (0.126) (0.036) (0.046) (0.060) (0.033) (0.043) (0.053)
log(w) 0.363*** 0.378 0.019*** -0.071 -0.048 -0.108 0.063 0.116* -0.116*
(0.080) (0.125) (0.134) (0.058) (0.080) (0.082) (0.046) (0.068) (0.067)
H.T. - - - - - - 89.23*** 88.87*** 8.8
R2 0.704 0.520 0.461 0.708 0.657 0.657 0.749 0.755 0.662
N 2934 1937 997 2934 1937 997 2934 1937 997
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. H.T. is the Hausman test to test the null of absence of correlation between
the individual effects and the regressors. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.Table 5: Results from panel data analysis with IV
Basic Model Large Model
logmi;t = ai+bt +qlogyi;t +ei;t logmi;t = ai+bt +glogRi;t +dlogwi;t +qlogyi;t +ei;t
Without Year Effects
Between Fixed Effects Between Fixed Effects
All Man Ret All Man Ret All Man Ret All Man Ret
log(y) 0.630*** 0.625*** 0.729*** 0.571*** 0.573*** 0.560*** 0.770*** 0.764*** 0.745*** 0.555*** 0.520*** 0.619***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.022) (0.026) (0.047) (0.050) (0.068) (0.071)
log(R) - - - - - - -0.328*** -0.366*** -0.249** -0.223*** -0.258*** -0.126*
- - - - - - (0.080) (0.107) (0.123) (0.044) (0.055) (0.071)
log(w) - - - - - - 0.141* 0.314** -0.095 0.001 0.058 -0.093
- - - - - - (0.080) (0.143) (0.124) (0.065) (0.092) (0.086)
R2 0.480 0.481 0.523 0.480 0.481 0.523 0.768 0.771 0.683 0.766 0.768 0.683
N 51930 40404 11526 51930 40404 11526 2427 1638 789 2427 1638 789
With Year Effects
Between Fixed Effects Between Fixed Effects
All Man Ret All Man Ret All Man Ret All Man Ret
log(y) 0.627*** 0.628*** 0.706*** 0.510*** 0.507*** 0.529*** 0.781*** 0.771*** 0.794*** 0.514*** 0.429*** 0.648***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.049) (0.052) (0.068) (0.076)
log(R) - - - - - - -0.283*** -0.229** -0.211* -0.207*** -0.250*** -0.116
- - - - - - (0.079) (0.104) (0.127) (0.044) (0.054) (0.074)
log(w) - - - - - - 0.228*** 0.415*** -0.025 -0.050 -0.060 -0.067
- - - - - - (0.083) (0.144) (0.141) (0.064) (0.091) (0.087)
R2 0.443 0.458 0.422 0.503 0.509 0.530 0.668 0.574 0.506 0.769 0.760 0.688
N 51930 40404 11526 51930 40404 11526 2427 1638 789 2427 1638 789
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The instruments are logyt¡1 for the basic model and logyt¡1, logRt¡1 and logwt¡1 for the large one. *, ** and
*** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.32
Table 6: Results from unbalanced panel data analysis
Basic Model: Large Model:
logmi;t = ai+bt +qlogyi;t +ei;t logmi;t = ai+bt +glogRi;t
+dlogwi;t +qlogyi;t +ei;t
Without Year Effects
All Man Ret All Man Ret
log(y) 0.689*** 0.694*** 0.735*** 0.764*** 0.748*** 0.776***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.017) (0.022) (0.032)
log(R) - - - -0.294*** -0.303*** -0.288**
- - - (0.075) (0.098) (0.112)
log(w) - - - 0.241*** 0.481*** -0.013
- - - (0.071) (0.139) (0.109)
R2 0.462 0.460 0.510 0.737 0.740 0.653
N 59951 46524 13427 2934 1937 997
With Year Effects
All Man Ret All Man Ret
log(y) 0.687*** 0.697*** 0.725*** 0.772*** 0.762*** 0.792***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.017) (0.022) (0.033)
log(R) - - - -0.239*** -0.244** -0.186
- - - (0.075) (0.098) (0.117)
log(w) - - - 0.319*** 0.415*** 0.093
- - - (0.074) (0.140) (0.121)
R2 0.437 0.432 0.435 0.727 0.606 0.535
N 59951 46524 13427 2934 1937 997
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Between estimator with weighted least squares. *, ** and *** indicate
signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.33
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Wage Elasticities34
Figure 2: Sale elasticities: Comparison
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Notes: Comparison of the estimated sales elasticities from different models with year
effects (YE) and without (NY). IV indicates models estimated with instrumental vari-
ables. The Basic Model is: logmi;t = ai +bt +qlogyi;t +ei;t. The Large Model is:
logmi;t = ai +bt +glogRi;t +dlogwi;t +qlogyi;t +ei;t. The different estimators are
the pooled regressions (Pooled), the between (Be), the ﬁxed effects (FE), the random
effects (RE) and the unbalanced (Unbalanced) for panel data.(*)  Requests for copies should be sent to:
Banca d’Italia – Servizio Studi – Divisione Biblioteca e pubblicazioni – Via Nazionale, 91 – 00184 Rome
(fax 0039 06 47922059). They are available on the Internet www.bancaditalia.it.
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